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Abstract
We consider a stochastic game of contribution to the common good in which the players
have continuous control over the degree of contribution, and we examine the gradualism aris-
ing from the free rider effect. This game belongs to the class of variable concession games
which generalize wars of attrition. Previously known examples of variable concession games in
the literature yield equilibria characterized by singular control strategies without any delay of
concession. However, these no-delay equilibria are in contrast to mixed strategy equilibria of
canonical wars of attrition in which each player delays concession by a randomized time. We
find that a variable contribution game with a single state variable, which extends the Nerlove-
Arrow model, possesses an equilibrium characterized by regular control strategies that result in
a gradual concession. This equilibrium naturally generalizes the mixed strategy equilibria from
the canonical wars of attrition. Stochasticity of the problem accentuates the qualitative differ-
ence between a singular control solution and a regular control equilibrium solution. We also find
that asymmetry between the players can mitigate the inefficiency caused by the gradualism.
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gradualism
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1 Introduction
Many business or public policy decisions concern the free rider problem when contributing to a
stock of common good. (Hardin, 1968). It is well-known that a free rider problem induces a wait
and see approach of the individuals who are in a position to contribute to the common good (Tirole,
2017). The wait and see approach in turn results in underinvestment in the common good. Hence, it
is important for decision makers and social planners to understand the game-theoretic implications
of the free rider problem involving the common good. Industry examples of a free rider prob-
lem with the common good can be found in the context of generic advertisement for commodities.
For instance, the advertising expenditures by Florida orange juice advertising programs not only
benefit the Florida orange juice industry, but it also benefits non-Florida orange juice importers
(Lee and Fairchild, 1988). In another example, it has been shown that a salmon promotion pro-
gram conducted by Norway has benefited its international competitors, too (Kinnucan and Myrland,
2003). In these examples, the advertising expenditures of one agent contribute to the stock of the
product’s overall goodwill, “which summarizes the effects of current and past advertising outlays on
demand” (Nerlove and Arrow, 1962). The stock of goodwill is the common good in the context of
generic advertising because it benefits other agents, even if they do not contribute to it. In this paper,
we examine the game of variable contribution to the common good where the stock of common
good evolves stochastically. In particular, we obtain the free rider effect on its Markov perfect equi-
librium (MPE) and compare and contrast it to other games of concession. We address the question
of whether the equilibrium suffers from the gradualism of the players’ contributions to the common
good and, if so, whether the inefficiency arising from the gradualism can be mitigated.
One objective of the paper is to fill the gaps in the equilibrium characteristics of variable conces-
sion games in which the cost is linear in the contribution. The problem of contribution to common
good belongs to the class of variable concession games in which the players can control the degree
of concession. This class of games constitutes a significant generalization of the war of attrition.
In the canonical war of attrition, each player can either continue the game or concede completely,
and it typically yields a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the players delay their concession by
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a randomized time. The central question of this paper concerns the characteristics of the variable
concession games. We can imagine three possibilities of equilibrium strategies: (1) singular control
(lump-sum contribution) strategies without time delay, (2) singular control strategies with time de-
lay, and (3) regular control strategies that lead to an equilibrium characterized by gradualism. In the
current literature, the variable concession games thus far have resulted in type (1) equilibrium with
singular control strategies of immediate lump-sum concession. Type (2), if it exists, is closest to the
mixed strategy equilibrium of the war of attrition, but it has not been found in the literature or in
this paper. The other natural generalization of the mixed strategy time delay equilibrium to variable
concession games is type (3), which has yet to be found in the current literature on variable conces-
sion games with linear cost. Our paper shows that type (3) is found in a very simple game-theoretic
and stochastic extension of the Nerlove-Arrow model of goodwill stock (Nerlove and Arrow, 1962;
Sethi, 1977; Lon and Zervos, 2011).
In our model, two players are considering irreversible and costly contribution to the stock of
common good. Each player can contribute any amount to the common good at any point in time,
but the common good increases the flow profit to both players. The stock of common good evolves
stochastically, and it tends to decline in time on average unless someone contributes to it, just as
the stock of goodwill for a product depreciates in time without advertisement (Nerlove and Arrow,
1962). In this game, the strategy of each player is represented by the dynamic path of its cumulative
contribution. We formulate the problem as a stochastic control game and utilize the well-established
stochastic control theory. In order to find the equilibrium, we need to obtain the best responses, so
we establish the verification theorem for the best response stochastic control.
This paper has three main contributions. First, we show that the model that we consider has
a gradualist equilibrium characterized by regular control. This result is in contrast to the typical
control solution: in a control problem with a linear cost structure, the single decision maker solution
is characterized by singular control rather than regular control. Second, we find that stochasticity
and asymmetry have significant impact on the equilibrium characteristics. In the deterministic game,
both the singular control solution and the equilibrium solution exhibit a stable steady state so that
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an outsider may not be able to tell the difference between the two. In contrast, in the stochastic
case, the two solutions exhibit markedly different behavior and are easier to observe in the empirical
sense. We also find that asymmetry between the players destabilizes the gradualist equilibrium, and
the outcome is an asymmetric equilibrium with singular control strategy adopted by at least one of
the players. Hence, asymmetry can mitigate the inefficiency of the gradualist equilibrium. Third,
the paper provides a mathematical framework to obtain an MPE of a stochastic game of variable
concession involving both singular and regular control.
Although there are many equilibrium solution concepts, we limit our attention toMPE (Maskin and Tirole,
2001). MPE is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the players’ actions are determined by the
current value, but not by the past history, of the economically relevant state variable, and hence it is
a key notion for analyzing a game.
Cooperative equilibrium concepts are beyond the scope of this paper. Coordinated plans of
action do produce an efficient outcome, which will change the form of the solution; for instance,
the singular control boundary will change. Although cooperation does happen between contributors
to common good, it often requires prior coordination or bargaining, and we can still consider the
non-cooperative MPE a baseline solution prior to coordination. For instance, in a Nash bargaining
solution (Nash, 1950), the non-cooperative MPE outcome can serve as the disagreement point, and
therefore, it is still a meaningful reference point.
The paper contributes to the literature on variable concession games, which an extension of a
war of attrition (Maynard Smith, 1974). Typical attrition games under complete information possess
mixed strategy equilibria with random time delays, both in the deterministic case (Hendricks et al.,
1988) and in the stochastic case (Steg, 2015; Georgiadis et al., 2019). In contrast, the known exam-
ples of the game of variable concession exhibit singular control equilibria with no time delay. One
example is Cournot competition under declining demand when the firms can reduce the production
capacity at a variable cost (Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1990). The equilibrium strategy is to imme-
diately reduce the capacity to the myopic Cournot equilibrium level through singular control. The
stochastic generalization of the Cournot model also exhibits similar characteristics (Steg, 2012).
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The paper also contributes to the literature on games of contribution to public goods. Fershtman and Nitzan
(1991) examine a dynamic game of voluntary contribution to public goods. In their model, players
continuously contribute to the stock of public goods over time. They obtain an equilibrium using a
differential game approach and demonstrate that the free riding problem is acute without commit-
ment. Their model is similar to ours, but they model a situation with costs that grow quadratically
with the rate of contribution, so it is prohibitively costly to make a lump sum contribution. Since
our model allows for a lump sum contribution due to the linear cost structure, the characteristics of
the equilibria are very different, and it is difficult to compare their results to ours. Battaglini et al.
(2014) examine a problem of dynamic free riding in which each individual allocates its endowment
between private consumption and irreversible contribution to the public good. They study the impli-
cations of the irreversibility of their model and conclude that irreversibility can alleviate inefficiency
of the equilibria. It is noteworthy that the equilibrium of their model involves lump sum contri-
bution (singular control) strategies. Ferrari et al. (2017) examine a significantly generalized model
with stochasticity to obtain its equilibria and study the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility of
contribution to the public good. They also obtain equilibria characterized by lump sum contribution
strategies. In contrast to the literature on private consumption and contribution to the public good,
our model does not incorporate consumption of the players.
Because our model assumes that the cost of contribution is linear in the magnitude of the
improvement in the common good, we formulate it as a game-theoretic extension of monotone
follower singular control problems with a single dimensional state variable. In a similar vein,
Lon and Zervos (2011) apply singular control framework to the Nerlove-Arrow model of expen-
diture in the stock of goodwill. Recently, some work on game-theoretic study of singular control
problems has emerged. Steg (2012) examines Cournot competition that leads to a singular control
equilibrium. Kwon and Zhang (2015) examines a singular control game in the context of a market
share competition in which a player’s control is to negate his opponent’s payoff. Ferrari et al. (2017)
also analyze a model that incorporates game-theoretic singular control, but the model has a more
complex structure as the players make consumption and contribution decisions at the same time.
5
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we examine a game of variable contribution to
the common good and show that it yields a regular control strategy equilibrium. In Section 3, we
examine the impact of stochasticity and asymmetry between the players. In particular, we show that
asymmetry eliminates the regular control equilibrium thereby improving the efficiency. In Section
4, we discuss several aspects of the results that are worthy of note. In Section 5, we summarize the
main results and implications of the paper and provide concluding remarks.
2 Variable Contribution Game
In this section, we present a game of variable contribution to the common good that results in a
regular control equilibrium. We first present the model in Section 2.1, and then we examine the
single decision maker case as a benchmark in Section 2.2. We construct the verification theorem for
best responses in Section 2.3 and obtain the regular control MPE in Section 2.4.
2.1 The Model
We consider a game between two players, each of whom receives a flow profit that depends on a
common state variable. Either player can boost the common state variable at a cost by any amount
at any point in time. The model is applicable to a number of industry examples. One example is
a game between two manufacturers who share a common supplier. Each manufacturer can make a
variable investment to boost the quality of the shared supplier, which in turn benefits the other man-
ufacturer through spillover (Muthulingam and Agrawal, 2016; Kim et al., 2017). Another example
is the game of irreversible and variable investment in the stock of goodwill (Nerlove and Arrow,
1962) through advertisement such as in generic advertising on commodities (Lee and Fairchild,
1988; Kinnucan and Myrland, 2003).
We let the process Z = {Zt : t ≥ 0} denote the stock of common good defined in the interval
I = (a,b) ⊆ R on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,Ft,P) that satisfies the usual condition. If
I =R, for example, it is understood that a=−∞ and b=∞. We assume that Z satisfies the following
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stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dZt = µ(Zt)dt+σ(Zt)dWt +dξit +dξ jt ,
whereW = {Wt : t ≥ 0} is a Wiener process progressively measurable with respect to {Ft : t ≥ 0}.
Here µ(·) is the drift term which we interpret as the time-averaged rate of change of Z in the absence
of control. In this paper, we assume µ(·) < 0 to model the deterioration of the common good. The
volatility σ(·) > 0 represents the magnitude of the white noise. The process ξi = {ξit : t ≥ 0} is a
non-decreasing ca`dla`g (right continuous with left limits) process controlled by player i adapted to
{Ft : t ≥ 0}. We interpret ξit as the cumulative contribution of player i to Z up to time t. Since each
player i controls the process ξi, we say that ξi is player i’s strategy, and ξ = (ξi,ξ j) is the strategy
profile. Throughout the paper, we let Ξi denote the set of all possible Ft-adapted control processes
ξi.
We remark that ξi is composed of a continuous process and a discontinuous process as follows:
ξit2−ξit−1
=
ˆ t2
t1
dξcit + ∑
t∈[t1,t2]
∆ξit ,
where ξci is the continuous part of ξi, and ∆ξit = ξit − ξit− is the instantaneous jump in ξi at time
t. Similarly, we can decompose the process Zt into a continuous part Z
c
t and a discontinuous part
∆Zt = Zt −Zt− = ∆ξ1t +∆ξ2t .
Given a strategy profile ξ, player i’s payoff is given by the following function:
Vi(x;ξ) = E
x
[ˆ ∞
0
e−rtpii(Zt)dt−
ˆ ∞
0
e−rtkidξit
]
.
Here Ex[·] = E[·|Z0 = x] is the conditional expectation operator given the initial condition Z0 = x.
The integrand pii(·) is a non-decreasing function that represents the profit flow for player i, and ki > 0
is the cost of increasing a unit of ξi. Lastly, r > 0 is the discount rate common to both players.
For the sake of analytical tractability, we make a number of assumptions below that are standard
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in the stochastic control literature. We first make some assumptions regarding µ(·) and σ(·). Let
X = {Xt : t ≥ 0} denote the uncontrolled process which satisfies dXt = µ(Xt)dt+σ(Xt)dWt .
Assumption 1 (i) µ(·) and σ(·) are Lipschitz continuous functions satisfying |µ(x)|+ |σ(x)| ≤ δ(1+
|x|) for some constant δ > 0.
(ii) {e−rτ(Xt)
− : τ is a stopping time, τ < ∞} is uniformly integrable for any initial value X0 = x.
Furthermore, limt→∞E
x[e−rt(Xt)
−] = 0.
Assumption 1 (i) implies that the uncontrolled process X has a unique strong solution to the SDE.
It also implies that σ(·) is locally bounded; this will be useful when we apply Dynkin’s formula to
the payoff function because the stochastic integral involving σ(Zt)dWt is a local martingale which
possesses convenient properties (Chapter IV, Revuz and Yor, 1999). Assumption 1 (ii) ensures that
the limiting behaviors of the process X are well-defined so that we can construct a verification
theorem in Section 2.3.
Below we letC(I) denote the set of continuous functions defined on I.
Assumption 2 pii(·) ∈ C(I) is strictly increasing and bounded from above, i.e., limx→bpii(x) <
piM for some positive constant piM. Furthermore, it satisfies the absolute integrability condition
E
x
[´ ∞
0 |e
−rtpii(Xt)|dt
]
< ∞ for the uncontrolled process X.
Assumption 2 ensures that the payoff Vi(x;ξ) is well-defined and that the function
(Rpii)(x) := E
x
[ˆ ∞
0
e−rtpii(X
x
t )dt
]
(1)
exists. The function (Rpii)(·) has the meaning of the payoff from perpetually keeping an uncontrolled
process X . Later we establish that (Rpii)(·) is an element of the payoff function.
Next, we define the r-excessive characteristic operator (Alvarez, 2003):
A :=
1
2
σ(x)2∂2x +µ(x)∂x− r . (2)
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We let ψ(·) and φ(·) respectively denote two linearly independent increasing and decreasing fun-
damental solutions to the differential equation Aψ(x) = Aφ(x) = 0 (Borodin and Salminen, 1996;
Alvarez, 2003). We remark that (Rpii)(·) satisfies the differential equation A(Rpii)(x)+ pii(x) = 0
according to the optimal stopping theory.
We also define the following functions
qi(x) = pii(x)+Akix= pii(x)+ [µ(x)− rx]ki , (3)
(Rqi)(x) = E
x
[ˆ ∞
0
e−rtqi(Xt)dt
]
,
and assume the following properties of (Rpii)(·) and qi(·):
Assumption 3 (i) (Rpii)(·) satisfies limx→a(Rpii)(x) < 0 and limx→a(Rpii)(x)/φ(x) = 0. (ii) There
exists some x∗i ∈ I such that qi(x) is strictly increasing for x< x
∗ and strictly decreasing for x> x∗.
(iii) limx→a q(x)=−∞, limx→a q(x)ψ
′(x)exp
(´ x
0
2µ(y)
σ2(y)
dy
)
= 0, limx→bq(x)φ
′(x)exp
(´ x
0
2µ(y)
σ2(y)
dy
)
=
0, and limx→b(Rq)
′(x)/φ′(x)> 0.
Assumption 3 serves as the sufficient condition for the unique optimal control solution to exist
for the model examined in Section 2.2. Specifically, in the single decision maker’s problem, the
assumptions drive a solution with a singular control region of the form (a,θ) for some threshold
θ. Assumption 3 (i) ensures that the flow profit function pii(·) is negative and well-behaved near a.
To gain an intuitive understanding of the assumptions regarding qi(·), we consider a special case
of µ(x) = µ, in which case q′i(x) = pi
′
i(x)− rki. Then Assumption 3 (ii) implies that pi
′
i(x) > rki for
x < x∗i and pi
′
i(x) < rki for x > x
∗
i . This implies that it is optimal to boost ξi if and only if x < x
∗
i .
Thus, the players have incentive to boost ξi only if Xt falls below a threshold. Assumption 3 (iii)
ensures that a unique threshold for boosting ξi exists for the model examined in Section 2.2.
2.2 Benchmark: Single Decision Maker Problem
In this subsection, we review the single decision maker problem as a benchmark and provide the
optimal solution. This class of problems is extensively examined in the literature (Alvarez, 2001;
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Øksendal and Sulem, 2005; Lon and Zervos, 2011), but we reproduce it here because its solution
will be utilized in the equilibrium solution of the game in the remainder of the paper.
Since there is only one decision maker, we drop the player index i for convenience throughout
Section 2.2. The value function associated with a control policy ξ = {ξt : t ≥ 0} is given by
V (x;ξ) = Ex
[ˆ ∞
0
e−rtpi(Zt)dt−
ˆ ∞
0
e−rtkdξt
]
.
The objective of the decision maker is to maximize V (·;ξ) with respect to ξ. This class of problems
is known as the singular stochastic control monotone follower problems.
We first provide the sufficient condition (the optimality condition) for the optimal control solu-
tion. We letCn(I) denote the set of functions defined on I that are n times continuously differentiable.
Suppose thatV (·)∈C2(I) satisfies the following conditions: (i) AV (x)+pi(x)≤ 0 andV ′(x)−k≤ 0
for all x ∈ I, and (ii) [AV (x) + pi(x)][V ′(x)− k] = 0 for all x ∈ I. Then V (x) coincides with the
optimal solution supξ∈ΞV (x;ξ). The proof of this sufficient condition is provided, for example, by
Øksendal and Sulem (2005) and Lon and Zervos (2011), and so we will not reproduce it here.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1–3, there exist a threshold θ ∈ I and a coefficient A such that the
optimal solution V (·) ∈C2(I) is given as follows:
V (x) =


k(x−θ)+V (θ) for x< θ
(Rpi)(x)+Aφ(x) for x≥ θ
. (4)
Next, we provide the intuition behind the solution through a numerical example.
Example 1: We consider a problem of constant µ(x) = µ < 0 and σ(x) = σ > 0 and the flow
profit pi(x) = 1− exp(νx) with ν < 0 that satisfies 12σ
2ν2+µν− r < 0. Then it is straightforward to
verify that φ(x) = exp(γ−x) and ψ(x) = exp(γ+x) where
γ± =
1
σ2
(−µ±
√
µ2+2rσ2) ,
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and
(Rpi)(x) =
1
r
−
exp(νx)
β
,
where β = r−µν−
1
2
σ2ν2 .
Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied in this example so that Lemma 1 applies. Furthermore, the optimal
threshold θ and the coefficient are given by
θ =
1
ν
ln
kβγ−
ν(ν− γ−)
,
A=
k− (Rpi)′(θ)
φ′(θ)
.
For the numerical illustration in Fig. 1, we set µ=−1, σ = r = k= 1. In this case, θ =−4.3605
is the optimal threshold. See Fig. 1 for a simulated sample path of Z and ξ and the optimal value
function V (x).
The optimal policy associated with the value function (4) is a singular control policy: to boost
Zt instantaneously up to θ whenever Zt falls below θ. If the initial value Z0 is below θ, then Zt
discontinuously jumps to θ at time 0, after which Zt is continuous. The threshold θ functions as
a reflecting boundary as shown in Fig. 1. In the region below θ, the value function is linear in x
with the slope k, as illustrated in the figure as well as expressed in (4). This is because (a,θ) is the
singular control region in which it costs exactly k to boost Z by a unit.
2.3 Verification Theorem for Best Responses
Next, we return to the game-theoretic model introduced in the beginning of the section. Our goal is
to construct the verification theorem for best responses, which will then be used to construct MPEs
in the remainder of the paper.
In a conventional solution to the singular control problem as in Section 2.2, the optimal control
process is decomposed as dξit = dξ
l
it +∆ξit where ∆ξit = ξit − ξit− represents the discontinuous
11
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Figure 1: Single decision maker solution. The dotted lines indicate the threshold θ.
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evolution of the process ξi while ξ
l
it is a continuous process like a local time (Protter, 2003). The
process ξlit is not absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure and cannot be represented
as an integral
´ t
0 uisds for any process ui = {uit : t ≥ 0} (Karatzas, 1983); for example, the sample
path of ξ in Figure 1 does not possess well-defined time derivatives when ξt increases in time. Both
components ξlit and ∆ξit constitute the singular part of ξit . In general, however, a control process
must also encompass a regular control process as follows:
dξit = uitdt+dξ
l
it +∆ξit ,
where uit ≥ 0 is a process adapted to (Ft).
To apply the conventional stochastic control theory, we need to define the feasible space of ui.
More specifically, in order for the SDE dZt = µ(Zt)dt+σ(Zt)dWt+∑
2
i=1dξit to have a unique strong
solution, we need to limit ui within the class of ui(t,x) that satisfies the two following conditions:
(1) ui(t,x) is Lipschitz continuous in x, and (2) |ui(t,x)| ≤ δ(1+ |x|) for some constant δ. Let U be
the set of functions u : (0,∞)× I→R that satisfy these two conditions. Then we let Σi denote the set
of Ft-adapted processes ξit that satisfy dξit = ui(t,Zt)dt+dξ
l
it +∆ξit for some ui ∈ U. We remark
that if ξi ∈ Σi then the SDE of Z
dZt = [µ(Zt)+
2
∑
i=1
ui(t,Zt)]dt+σ(Zt)dWt +
2
∑
i=1
(dξlit +∆ξit)
satisfies the sufficient condition for possessing a unique strong solution because ui ∈ U. Note also
that Σi is a proper subset of the feasible strategy space Ξi, which is the set of all possible Ft-adapted
control processes ξit .
Let Mi be the set of player i’s Markov control strategies ξi which depend only on the current
value of Zt . It means that ξit satisfies dξit = ui(Zt)dt+dξ
l
it +∆ξit where the singular control region
is given as a subset of I. For instance, if the singular control region of player i is [α,β], then whenever
Zt− ∈ [α,β], ξ undergoes a jump ∆ξit = β−Zt− , i.e., player i boosts Z up to β. Furthermore, dξ
l
it > 0
only when Zt hits β. By definition, an MPE is a subgame perfect equilibrium ξ= (ξi,ξ j) that belongs
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to Mi×M j.
For the purpose of obtaining MPE ξ ∈ Mi ×M j we can safely focus on obtaining the best
response strategies ξ′i ∈ Ξi in response to the opponent’s Markov strategy ξ j ∈ M j, i.e., to ob-
tain ξi ∈ Ξi such that Vi(x;ξi,ξ j) = supξ′i∈ΞiVi(x;ξ
′
i,ξ j). If the best response ξi happens to be-
long to Mi, then ξ = (ξi,ξ j) is an MPE. Note that we do not, however, look for ξi ∈ Mi such
that Vi(x;ξi,ξ j) = supξ′i∈MiVi(x;ξ
′
i,ξ j); because Mi ⊂ Ξi, there may be another ξ
′
i ∈ Ξi such that
Vi(x;ξ
′
i,ξ j)>Vi(x;ξi,ξ j), in which case (ξi,ξ j) is not a Nash equilibrium.
Since we assume a Markov control process ξ j ∈ M j, we can partition the interval I into regions
of discontinuous ξ jt and continuous ξ jt . Let C j denote the open subset of I in which ξ jt evolves
continuously and non-singularly in time, and let D j = I\C j denote the singular control region where
dξcjt > 0 or ∆ξ jt > 0.
Now we provide sufficient conditions for the best response to ξ j.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions 1–3 hold. Assume player j’s Markov strategy ξ j ∈ M j ∩Σ j that
satisfies dξ jt = u j(Zt)dt+dξ
l
jt+∆ξ jt for some function u j(·)≥ 0. Suppose that there exist a function
U(·) on I and some Markov strategy ξ∗i ∈ Mi∩Σi that satisfy the SDE
dξ∗it = u
∗
i (Zt)dt+dξ
∗l
it +∆ξ
∗
it (5)
for some u∗i (·)≥ 0 and the following conditions:
(i) U(·) ∈ C2(C j)∩C(I), and U(·) is non-decreasing and bounded from above. Furthermore,
U ′(x) = 0 in the interior of D j, andU
′(Zt)dξ
l
jt = 0 for all t, where Z is the state process that evolves
under the strategy profile (ξ∗i ,ξ j).
(ii) There is a function U˜(x) ∈C2(I) such that U˜(x) =U(x) for all x ∈C j and U˜
′(x) is bounded
for x ∈ D j.
(iii) max{AU(x)+ pii(x)+ u j(x)U
′(x)+ viU
′(x)− viki,U
′(x)− ki} ≤ 0 for all x ∈ C j and any
arbitrary vi ≥ 0.
(iv) Let Di = {x ∈ I : ∆ξ
∗
it > 0 whenever x = Zt−} ∩C j be player i’s singular control region
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within C j and Ci = {x ∈ I : ∆ξ
∗
it = 0 whenever x = Zt−}∩C j. Then AU(x)+pii(x)+ u j(x)U
′(x)+
u∗i (x)U
′(x)−u∗i (x)ki = 0 for all x ∈Ci and U
′(x) = ki for all x ∈ Di.
Then ξ∗i is the best response to ξ j amongst all control processes that belong to Σi, i.e., Vi(x;ξ
∗
i ,ξ j)=
supξi∈ΣiVi(x;ξi,ξ j).
Remark: Strictly speaking, Theorem 1 does not give sufficient conditions for the best response
among the whole strategy space Ξi, but it gives sufficient conditions for the best response among
the limited space Σi. However, the strategy profiles that we obtain in Theorem 2 and Proposition 1
are proper MPE. This result is obtained because even though Theorem 1 is used to obtain (ξ1,ξ2) ∈
Σ1×Σ2 that satisfies Vi(x;ξi,ξ j) = supξ′i∈ΣiVi(x;ξ
′
i,ξ j) for both i= 1,2, we can show that
Vi(x;ξi,ξ j) = sup
ξ′i∈Ξi
Vi(x;ξ
′
i,ξ j) ,
by the optimality condition for singular control given in Section 2.2. The same is true if i and j are
interchanged. Therefore, (ξ1,ξ2) is a proper MPE. The detail is provided in the proof of Theorem 2.
2.4 Regular Control Strategy Equilibrium
Next, we construct a regular control MPE. We define a regular control MPE as one with control
strategies of the following form for both players i= 1,2:
dξit = ui(Zt)dt ,
where ξi ∈ Σi. In this subsection, we assume that the two players are symmetric, i.e., pii = pi j = pi
and ki = k j = k.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 1–3 hold. Let V (·) denote the solution (4) to the single decision
maker problem. Also define a symmetric strategy profile ξ= (ξ1,ξ2) with the regular control process
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dξit = u(Zt)dt, where
u(x) =


−1
k
(AV (x)+pi(x)) for x< θ
0 for x≥ θ
. (6)
Lastly, suppose u(·) ∈ U. Then ξ is an MPE with a symmetric payoff Vi(x;ξ) =Vj(x;ξ) =V (x).
Theorem 2 obtains an MPE completely characterized by regular control. Intuitively, both players
exert gradual control u(·) if and only if Z is sufficiently low (less than θ). The regular control MPE
is reminiscent of the mixed strategy delay equilibrium of the canonical war of attrition in which
both players gradually concede in the probabilistic sense through a Poisson process. Thus, we
may consider the regular control strategy equilibrium a generalization of the mixed strategy delay
equilibrium.
One notable characteristic of the regular control MPE is that the threshold of the control region
θ is identical to the threshold of singular control region in the single decision maker solution. It
implies that the free rider effect does not shift the control threshold; instead, it drives gradualism.
Example 2: We now consider the game-theoretic extension of Example 1. For analytical tractabil-
ity, the profit flow pi(·) is modified as follows:
pi(x) =


1− exp(νx) for x≥ xc
pi(xc)+(x− xc)ρ for x< xc
,
where ρ > rk and xc < θ are parameters that we specify below. The form of pi(·) is modified so
that |pi(x)| does not grow faster than |x| for sufficiently large |x|. The modification is necessary to
ensure that ui(x) in equilibrium does not grow faster than |x| for large |x|, preserving the well-known
sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the strong solution to SDE of Z.
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In this case, the function (Rpi)(x) has a more complicated form. Define
f1(x) =
1
r
−
exp(νx)
β
,
f2(x) =
ρµ
r2
+
pi(xc)
r
+
ρ
r
(x− xc) ,
so that A f1(x)+pi(x) = 0 for x> xc and A f2(x)+pi(x) = 0 for x< xc. Then
(Rpi)(x) =


f1(x)+ c1φ(x) for x≥ xc
f2(x)+ c2ψ(x) for x< xc
,
where c1 and c2 are chosen so that (Rpi)(x) is continuous and differentiable at x = xc. Note that
this modification of pi(·) does not alter the single decision maker solution of Section 2.2 if xc is
sufficiently low (lower than θ and x∗) and if ρ > rk so that Assumption 3 is satisfied.
From (6), we have
u(x) =


0 for x≥ θ
−AV (x)+pi(x)
k
=−µ+ r
k
V (θ)+ r(x−θ)− 1
k
pi(x) for x< θ
. (7)
Note that |u(x)| < δ(1+ |x|) for some constant δ, so the unique strong solution to the SDE for Z
exists.
Figure 2 illustrates a simulated sample path of Z and ξi and the rate of contribution u(·) as a
function of Z where ρ = 2 and xc = −10 and the other model parameters are set as in Figure 1
including θ = −4.3605. Note that Z freely fluctuates below θ in the regular control equilibrium. In
contrast, Z in the single decision maker’s solution shown in Figure 1 never falls below θ because it
is subject to singular control at θ. The sample path of ξit =
´ t
0 u(Zs)ds is smooth and differentiable
with respect to time in the regular control equilibrium, in contrast to the sample path of ξ in Figure
1. The rate u(·) gradually grows as Z decreases; this is because the players have stronger incentive
to control Z for lower values of Z.
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Figure 2: Symmetric regular control equilibrium. The dotted lines indicate the threshold θ.
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Remark: The MPE obtained in Theorem 2 exists as long as the solution shown in Lemma 1
exists. Hence, Assumptions 1–3 do not need to hold as long as the single decision maker control
problem yields a single-threshold singular control solution.
3 Impact of Stochasticity and Asymmetry
In this section, we examine the implications of stochasticity and asymmetry on the regular control
equilibrium that we obtain in Section 2.4. This is an important inquiry because most realistic situa-
tions often possess stochastic state variables and heterogeneity among the players. We first examine
the case of deterministic Z in Section 3.1 and contrast its equilibrium to that of the stochastic game.
We find that the contrast between a single decision maker solution and an equilibrium is starker in
the stochastic case. Then we examine an asymmetric game in Section 3.2 and find that a regular con-
trol MPE does not exist in an asymmetric game. Instead, asymmetry leads to asymmetric equilibria
with singular control strategies.
3.1 Deterministic Game
To examine the impact of stochasticity, we will simply discuss the deterministic case of Example 2
and contrast it to the stochastic case.
Example 3: We revisit the model of Example 2 and set σ = 0 and xc =−∞. Then the character-
istic operator
A = µ∂z− r
is a first-order differential operator, and there is only one fundamental solution φ(x) = exp(rx/µ)
that satisfies Aφ(x) = 0. Furthermore,
(Rpi)(x) =
1
r
−
exp(νx)
r−µν
,
19
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Equilibrium solution
Single DM solution
Figure 3: Deterministic solutions.
where we assume µν < r. The critical threshold of control is given by
θ =
1
ν
ln
kr
|ν|
.
As in Example 2, u(·) is given by (7). It is straightforward to verify that limx↑θ u(x)= 0, limx↑θ u
′(x)=
0 and that u′′(x) > 0 for all x < θ, which implies that u′(x) < 0 for all x < θ. Furthermore, there
exists η < θ at which µ+2u(η) = 0 so that dZt/dt < 0 for Zt > η and dZt/dt > 0 for Zt < η.
Lastly, we can show that Zt asymptotically approaches η if Z0 6= η. Define yt = Zt −η. For yt
sufficiently close to 0, we have
dyt
dt
= µ+2u(yt +η) = µ+2u(η)+2u
′(η)yt +O(y
2
t )
= 2u′(η)yt +O(y
2
t ) ,
where we used the fact that µ+ 2u(η) = 0 in the last equality. Recall that u′(η) < 0; thus, |yt | =
|y0|exp[2u
′(η)t+O(yt)] for large t, which implies limt→∞ yt = 0. Hence, η is the steady state of Z.
Figure 3 illustrates Zt as a function of t in the equilibrium where θ =−4.0132 and η =−5.68646.
In the deterministic case of the single decision maker problem, Zt follows the horizontal line
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z = θ as soon as Zt hits θ. Thus, θ is the steady state of the single decision maker solution. Hence,
in the deterministic model, the behavior of Zt exhibits very little qualitative difference between the
single decision maker solution and the equilibrium of the game. In particular, an outside observer
will not be able to tell the difference between the two solutions except that the steady state values
differ. The difference in the steady state value of Z can be simply attributed to the free rider effect:
the players are less willing to contribute to the common good, so the steady state is lower.
In contrast, in the presence of stochasticity (σ > 0), the behavior of Zt is markedly different as
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2: in the single decision maker’s case, Zt is reflected off of the threshold
θ, whereas in the equilibrium of the game, Zt can assume any value although it tends to fluctuate
around θ. We conclude that stochasticity induces qualitatively different behaviors between the two
solutions and hence renders the regular control equilibrium observable to an outsider.
3.2 Asymmetric Game
Next, we examine the impact of asymmetry between the two players. We first show that a regular
control MPE is absent in an asymmetric game in Section 3.2.1, and then we construct the simplest
class of asymmetric equilibria in Section 3.2.2 and demonstrate that they exhibit the key character-
istics of a singular control solution.
3.2.1 Absence of a Regular Control MPE
Suppose that θi 6= θ j because of asymmetry (ki 6= k j and/or pii 6= pi j), where θi is the unique solution
to the equation
ki− (Rpii)
′(θi)
φ′(θi)
=−
(Rpii)
′′(θi)
φ′′(θi)
.
For analytical tractability, we make the following additional assumption:
Assumption 4 µ′(x)+pi′(x)− rk 6= 0 almost everywhere x ∈ I.
Assumption 4 ensures that µ(x)+pi(x)−rk is never constant within any given non-empty interval. It
gives a non-trivial structure to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of the payoff function.
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The following theorem establishes that there is no payoff function Vi(·;ξ) ∈ C
2(I) associated
with a regular control MPE.
Theorem 3 If θi 6= θ j, then there is no regular control MPE ξ = (ξi,ξ j)∈Σi×Σ j such that Vi(·;ξ)∈
C2(I) for i= 1,2.
The implication of Theorem 3 is that an MPE of an asymmetric game must involve singular
control. Hence, the natural next step is to explore the form of such a singular control MPE in an
asymmetric game, which is the goal of Section 3.2.2.
Remark 1: Strictly speaking, Theorem 3 does not necessarily preclude the possibility of an equi-
librium with payoffs Vi(·;ξ) that do not belong to C
2(I) such as a general viscosity solution. In this
paper, we limit ourselves to equilibria that produce classic solutions only and defer the possibility
of an equilibrium with non-C2(I) viscosity solutions to future endeavors. We also remark that we do
not attempt to exclude the possibility of an equilibrium ξ that does not belong to Σi×Σ j. This pos-
sibility is beyond the scope of the paper because of the issue of the existence of the unique solution
to the SDE for Zt ; this is a common restriction in stochastic control theory (Øksendal and Sulem,
2005).
Remark 2: Even in an asymmetric game, it is possible to have some combinations of ki and pii(·)
such that θ1 = θ2. In this case, a regular control MPE is possible because Theorem 2 is applicable.
As a corollary, we can also exclude the possibility of an MPE in which there is a common regular
control region (α,β) for some α > a and a no-control region [β,b). (We remark that the proof of
Theorem 3 establishes that the regular control regions of the two players must coincide.) We remain
agnostic about what happens in the region (a,α], however, except that (a,α] should contain singular
control regions D1 and D2 if they exist. Again, we focus on an MPE with classical solutions, i.e.,
Vi(·;ξ) ∈C
2(I\D j).
Corollary 1 There is no MPE ξ ∈ Σi× Σ j such that Vi(·;ξ) ∈ C
2(I\D j) with a common regular
control region (α,β) for some α > a and a no-control region [β,b).
Its proof essentially follows that of Theorem 3, so it is omitted.
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3.2.2 Non-regular Control Asymmetric MPE
By virtue of Theorem 3, an asymmetric game allows no regular control MPE, so any MPE must
involve some singular control by at least one player. Furthermore, Corollary 1 implies that the only
possible equilibria are the ones with a singular control region [α,β] of one player and a no-control
region (β,b). Our goal is to present the simplest class of such equilibria and compare its character-
istics to those of the regular control MPE. Although our main focus is on strictly asymmetric games,
we will keep our discourse general and implicitly include the case of a symmetric game.
As a candidate for an asymmetric MPE, we consider a strategy profile ξ in which player 1 exerts
singular control in the interval [θ′,θ1] and regular control in (a,θ
′) for some θ′ < θ1 while player 2
exerts regular control in (a,θ′). Furthermore, we define the regular control rate functions
u1(x) =


− 1
k2
[AU2(x)+pi2(x)] for x< θ
′ ,
0 otherwise
, (8)
u2(x) =


− 1
k1
[AU1(x)+pi1(x)] for x< θ
′ ,
0 otherwise
, (9)
whereU1(·),U2(·) are given by
U1(x) =V1(x) ,
U2(x) =


Bφ(x)+(Rpi2)(x) x≥ θ1
U2(θ1) x ∈ (θ
′,θ1)
U2(θ1)+(x−θ
′)k2 x≤ θ
′
,
Here V1(·) denotes the solution to the single decision maker problem given by (4) where k, θ and pi
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are respectively replaced by k1, θ1 and pi1, and
B=−
(Rpi2)
′(θ1)
φ′(θ1)
, (10)
U2(θ1) = Bφ(θ1)+(Rpi2)(θ1) .
Note that the functionsU1(·),U2(·) are actually the payoff functions associated with the proposed
strategy profile ξ. In the region (θ1,b), bothU1(·) andU2(·) assume the form of continuation region
without control. In player 1’s singular control region [θ′,θ1], we have U
′
1(x) = k1 because player 1
expends the cost of singular control while U ′2(x) = 0 because player 2 does not expend any cost in
this region. In the common regular control region (a,θ′), both players expend cost in such a way
thatU ′i (x) = ki.
By Theorem 3, to confirm that the strategy profile ξ is an MPE, we only need to verify the
following sufficient conditions:
U ′2(x)≤ k2 ∀x ∈ I\{θ1,θ
′}, (11)
AU2(x)+pi2(x)≤ 0 ∀x ∈ I\{θ1,θ
′}, (12)
u1(·) ∈ U ,u2(·) ∈ U . (13)
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold and (11)-(13) are satisfied. Then the strategy
profile ξ is an MPE with the payoff functions given by V1(x;ξ) =U1(x) and V2(x;ξ) =U2(x).
Example 4: Recall Example 2 and set µ = −1, σ = r = k1 = k2 = 1, ρ = 2, and xc = −10 just
as in Figure 2. Then θ = −4.3605 is the boundary of the control region. Here we can construct an
asymmetric equilibrium as in Proposition 1 because we can verify that any choice of θ′ < θ1 = θ
satisfies conditions (11) and (12). Hence, there is a continuum of asymmetric equilibria parameter-
ized by θ′ ∈ (−∞,θ1). Figure 4 illustrates a numerical example of the case θ
′ =−6. Note that even
if we set k1 < k2, the qualitative features of this asymmetric equilibrium continue to hold.
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Figure 4: Sample path of Zt in an asymmetric equilibrium.
In particular, Figure 4 illustrates the case when Z0 < θ
′. Before Zt hits θ
′ for the first time, Zt
is subject to regular control of both players. Upon reaching θ′, Zt is subject to singular control by
player 1 and is boosted up to θ1. Once Zt enters the region [θ1,∞), the threshold θ1 takes the role
of a reflecting boundary for Zt because of player 1’s singular control strategy. If Zt ∈ [θ1,∞), the
equilibrium reduces to the single decision maker solution.
As illustrated by the example, asymmetric non-regular equilibria exist even for the symmetric
game where k1 = k2 and pi1 = pi2. However, if the two players are identical to each other, the play-
ers are likely to be drawn to the symmetric equilibrium. For instance, suppose that the equilibrium
shown in Figure 4 is the outcome of the symmetric game. Then eventually player 1 ends up being the
only one contributing to the common good every time Zt hits θ, so he will feel that the current equi-
librium is unfair to him. Consequently, he will likely attempt to switch to a more equitable equilib-
rium. Thus, the symmetric regular MPE is the likely focal point equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991). In contrast, in an asymmetric game in which the two players have unequal thresholds θi 6= θ j,
the only possible equilibrium is an asymmetric non-regular control one by virtue of Theorem 3.
One interesting question regards which player exerts singular control. In the numerical example
above, we can fix k1 = 1 and vary the value of k2 and see how that affects the equilibrium. It can
be numerically verified that the MPE of Proposition 1 exists as long as k2 ≥ 0.5383. If k2 is less
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than the critical value 0.5383, then (11) is violated, so the MPE is not possible. Intuitively, if k2 is
sufficiently low, then player 2 has strong incentive to exert singular control, and knowing this, player
1 would never exert singular control. In this case, the only equilibrium is the one in which player 2
exerts singular control. Thus, sufficiently high asymmetry induces the more efficient player to exert
singular control in an equilibrium. If the asymmetry is modest, then either player can be the one
who exerts singular control.
In summary, the MPE obtained by Proposition 1 is the simplest form of asymmetric equilibria.
In these equilibria, Zt eventually ends up in the region [θ1,b) and subject to the reflecting boundary
at θ1. Thus, in the long run, Zt is subject to the singular control policy of player 1 just as in the
single decision maker’s case, and it is not plagued by the gradualism of the regular control MPE of
Section 2.4. Therefore, we conclude that asymmetry reduces inefficiency.
4 Discussions
4.1 Dimensionality of the State Variable
In contrast to the singular control equilibria obtained in, for example, Ghemawat and Nalebuff
(1990), Steg (2012), Battaglini et al. (2014), Ferrari et al. (2017), and Appendix B, a regular control
equilibrium arises in our model. We speculate that we obtain a contrasting result because of the
difference in the dimensionality of the state variable. In the model that we study, the state variable
Zt is one-dimensional; the control variables ξit and ξ jt only add to Zt , so they are not indepen-
dent state variables that stand alone. In contrast, in the examples from the literature as well as the
R&D spillover game analyzed in Appendix B, the state variables are multidimensional because the
players’ control variables are decoupled from the state variable. For instance, in the R&D game
of Appendix B, the state variable is two-dimensional: (λ1t ,λ2t), where λit is the current level of
R&D effort of firm i. Consequently, the possibility of a subgame with λ1t 6= λ2t is allowed, so the
state variable is allowed to be asymmetric between the two players. However, as shown by Section
3.2.2, the regular control equilibrium of Theorem 2 hinges on the symmetry of the state variable
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between the two players so that they share the common regular control region (see the proof of The-
orem 2). Thus, we anticipate that the emergence of a regular control equilibrium is driven by the
single-dimensionality of the state variable.
4.2 N-Player Game
We can straightforwardly generalize Theorem 2 to an N-player game for N > 2 by constructing a
symmetric regular control equilibrium. We first define uN(·) as follows:
uN(x) =


− 1
k(N−1) (AV (x)+pi(x)) for x< θ
0 for x≥ θ
,
where V (·) is given by (4). Then it can be verified that a strategy profile ξ in which each player
i exerts a regular control of dξit = u
N(Zt)dt constitutes a MPE. This is because the HJB equation
(condition (iii) of Theorem 1) for each player’s payoff function continues to be satisfied when all
N−1 opponents exert the regular control of uN(Zt)dt.
4.3 Relation to Mixed Strategy Equilibrium of War of Attrition
There exists a close analogy between the regular control equilibrium obtained in Theorem 2 and the
mixed strategy equilibrium of a war of attrition. In the mixed strategy equilibrium of the canonical
war of attrition, each player has control over the hazard rate of exit, which is analogous to the rate
of regular control in our model. Similarly, a pure strategy concession (a deterministic concession)
in a war of attrition is analogous to the singular control strategy in our model.
The analogy between the two equilibrium solutions goes even further with the impact of asym-
metry. In a stochastic extension of a war of attrition game, the mixed strategy MPEs disappear when
the players’s reward from concession is asymmetric (Georgiadis et al., 2019). This is analogous to
our result that a completely regular control MPE disappears when the players are asymmetric.
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5 Conclusions
We examine a stochastic game of variable contribution as a generalization of a war of attrition. In
particular, we analyze a stochastic game-theoretic extension of the Nerlove-Arrow model, which
possesses a novel MPE characterized by regular control. This finding is in contrast to the singular
control equilibria possessed by variable concession games with multidimensional state variables. In
the examples of singular control equilibria obtained in the literature, the free rider effect manifests
in the value of the threshold of the control region, but the action of concession is immediate and not
plagued by delay or gradualism. In contrast, the variable contribution game analyzed in Section 2
possesses a regular control equilibrium in which the free rider effect manifests in the gradualism of
the players’ actions.
We find that it is important to understand the effect of stochasticity on the game. The state vari-
able Z exhibits qualitatively different behavior under a regular control MPE from that of a single
decision maker solution. However, the difference almost disappears if the state variable is determin-
istic. We conclude that stochasticity renders the gradual MPE observable to an outsider.
We also examine the impact of asymmetry between the players and find that the regular con-
trol MPE is not possible under asymmetry. The implication of this finding is that the problem of
inefficiency arising from the gradual regular control MPE is mitigated by asymmetry between the
players. From a social planner’s perspective, this result suggests that heterogeneity between agents
should be cultivated or encouraged when there is a free rider problem with the agents’ contributions
to the common good.
The results and their implications of this paper warrant some related future research endeavors.
First, it will be interesting to study multidimensional variable concession problems and see if they
have gradual regular control MPE even though we speculate that they do not. Second, it will be
fruitful to examine an extension of our model in which the players have private types and asymmetric
information regarding the cost of contribution. In this case, there is inherent asymmetry between
any two players, so the regular control equilibrium may exist only under very stringent conditions.
Lastly, just as Wang (2009) finds empirical evidence of a delay in action in a war of attrition, it
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might be possible to find empirical evidence of gradualism in a regular control equilibrium for a
contribution game with a free rider problem such as in generic advertising or investment in public
goods.
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A Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Because the first and second derivatives of V (·) are continuous at θ, the coef-
ficient A and the threshold θ must satisfy k = (Rpi)′(θ)+Aφ′(θ) and 0 = (Rpi)′′(θ)+Aφ′′(θ). The
simultaneous equations are solved if we can find θ that satisfies
k− (Rpi)′(θ)
φ′(θ)
=−
(Rpi)′′(θ)
φ′′(θ)
. (A.1)
Below we show that there is a unique value of θ that satisfies this condition and that the resulting
solutionV (·) satisfies the optimality conditions for singular stochastic control.
As a first step, we show that the function F(x) := (k− (Rpi)′(x))/φ′(x) achieves a unique global
maximum at x = θ ∈ I. If this holds, then it is straightforward to verify that (A.1) is satisfied.
Note that (Rq)′(x) = (Rpi)′(x)− k from the definition of q in (3) without the player index i, so
F(x) = −(Rq)′(x)/φ′(x). From the theory of diffusive processes (Borodin and Salminen, 1996;
Alvarez and Lempa, 2008), it is well-known that
(Rq)(x) = B−1
[
φ(x)
ˆ x
a
ψ(y)q(y)m′(y)dt+ψ(x)
ˆ b
x
φ(y)q(y)m′(y)dt
]
,
where
B=
1
S′(x)
[ψ′(x)φ(x)−φ′(x)ψ(x)] ,
m′(x) =
2
σ2(x)S′(x)
,
S′(x) = exp
(
−
ˆ x
0
2µ(y)
σ2(y)
dy
)
.
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Thus, we have
dF(x)
dx
=−
2S′(x)
σ2(x)[φ′(x)]2
L(x) , (A.2)
where L(x) =−
q(x)φ′(x)
S′(x)
− r
ˆ b
x
φ(y)q(y)m′(y)dy .− x (A.3)
By the definitions of m′(·) and S′(·), we can derive the equality d(φ′(x)/S′(x))/dx= rφ(x)m′(x) by
some algebra, from which we obtain
dL(x)
dx
=−q′(x)
φ′(x)
S′(x)
.
By Assumption 3 (ii), q′(x) > 0 for x ∈ (a,x∗) and q′(x) < 0 for (x∗,b), we have dL(x)/dx >
0 for x ∈ (a,x∗) and dL(x)/dx < 0 for x ∈ (x∗,b). From limx→aφ
′(x)/S′(x) = −∞ (p. 19 of
Borodin and Salminen (1996)) and limx→a q(x) =−∞ from Assumption 3 (iii), we have for y suffi-
ciently close to a,
L(y)− lim
x→a
L(x) = lim
x→a
ˆ y
x
dL(u)
du
du= lim
x→a
ˆ y
x
[−q′(u)]
φ′(u)
S′(u)
du>
φ′(y)
S′(y)
lim
x→a
ˆ y
x
[−q′(u)]du= ∞ ,
so that limx→aL(x) = −∞. Furthermore, because limx→b q(x)φ
′(x)/S′(x) = 0 from Assumption 3
(iii), we also have limx→bL(x) = 0 by the expression (A.3). From the continuity of L(·) and the
sign change of dL(x)/dx, it follows that L(θ) = 0 for some unique point θ ∈ (a,x∗). Since L(·) is
monotonically increasing in the interval (a,x∗), L(·) turns from negative to positive at θ. Combined
with the behavior of L(x) in the limits x→ a,b, we conclude that L(x) is negative in the interval
(a,θ) and positive in the interval (θ,b). From (A.2), we also conclude that F(x) attains its global
maximum at this unique point θ. Thus, (A.1) is also satisfied, which makesV (·)∈C2(I) if A= F(θ).
The next step is to prove that V (·) satisfies the sufficient conditions (i) and (ii) of the optimality.
(i) First, we show that AV (x)+pi(x) ≤ 0 and V ′(x)− k ≤ 0 for all x ∈ I. For x > θ, the form
of V (·) guarantees the condition AV (x)+pi(x) = 0. Furthermore, because F(x) < F(θ) = A for all
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x> θ, we have (k− (Rpi)′(x))/φ′(x)< A, from which we obtain
V ′(x) = Aφ′(x)+(Rpi)′(x)< k
for all x> θ.
For x < θ, we have V ′(x) = k by the form of V (·). Also note that V ′′(θ) = 0, V ′(θ) = k and
AV (x)+pi(x) = 0 for x> θ so that
lim
x↓θ
AV (x)+pi(x) = µ(θ)k− rV (θ)+pi(θ) = 0 .
For any x< θ, we have
AV (x)+pi(x)− [lim
y↓θ
AV (y)+pi(y)] = µ(x)k− rV (x)+pi(x)− [µ(θ)k− rV(θ)+pi(θ)]
= q(x)−q(θ)< 0
where the inequality is from the fact that q(·) increases in the interval (a,θ). Thus, AV (x)+pi(x)< 0
for x< θ.
(ii) We just showed that AV (x)+pi(x) = 0 for x≥ θ and V ′(x)− k = 0 for x≤ θ.
Proof of Theorem 1: To prove the theorem, it is sufficient to show that U(x) = Vi(x;ξ
∗
i ,ξ j) ≥
Vi(x;ξi,ξ j) for any arbitrary strategy ξi of player i that satisfies dξit = ui(t,Zt)+dξ
c
it +∆ξit . First,
it is straightforward to verify that if ξ∗i is the best response, player i should not expend any cost
to control Z within D j because player j is already doing so in that region. Thus, one necessary
condition for the payoff function of the best response isU ′(x) = 0 in the interior of D j.
We consider an arbitrary strategy ξi of player i that satisfies dξit = ui(t,Zt)dt+ dξ
c
it +∆ξit for
some arbitrary ui(·) ∈ U. Let Z be the state process dictated by the given strategy profile (ξi,ξ j).
By conditions (i) and (iii), U ′(·) is a bounded function. Furthermore, due to Assumption 1 (i),
e−rsσ(Zs)U˜
′(Zs) is locally bounded. Hence, the process Mt :=
´ t
0 e
−rsσ(Zs)U˜
′(Zs)dWs is a contin-
uous local martingale. By the definition of a continuous local martingale (Karatzas and Shreve,
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1998), there exists a non-decreasing sequence {τn}
∞
n=1 of stopping times of {Ft}t>0 such that
limn→∞ τn = ∞ a.s. and {Mτn∧t : t ∈ [0,∞)} is a martingale for each n. We first consider any x ∈C j
as the initial point of Z. By the generalized Itoˆ’s formula, we have
e−rτn∧tU˜(Zτn∧t) =U˜(x)+
ˆ τn∧t
0
e−rsAU˜(Zs)ds
+
ˆ τn∧t
0
e−rsU˜ ′(Zs)[ui(t,Zs)ds+u j(Zs)ds+
2
∑
l=1
dξcls]
+ ∑
0≤s≤τn∧t
e−rs[U˜(Zs)−U˜(Zs−)]+Mτn∧t .
Taking the expectation of both sides and rearranging terms, we obtain
U˜(x) =Ex[e−rτn∧tU˜(Zτn∧t)]−E
x
[ˆ τn∧t
0
e−rs(AU˜(Zs)+U˜
′(Zs)u j(Zs)+U˜
′(Zs)ui(s,Zs))ds
]
−Ex
[ˆ τn∧t
0
e−rsU˜ ′(Zs)
2
∑
l=1
dξcls+ ∑
0≤s≤τn∧t
e−rs[U˜(Zs)−U˜(Zs−)]
]
. (A.4)
Here we use the fact that Ex[Mτn∧t ] = 0 becauseMτn∧t is a martingale.
Next, we re-express (A.4) as an inequality involvingU(·) and ξi alone. Recall that U˜(x) =U(x)
whenever x ∈C j, so U˜(Zt) =U(Zt) whenever Zt is continuous in time. Thus, if Zs ∈C j,
AU˜(Zs)+U˜
′(Zs)(ui(t,Zs)+u j(Zs)) = AU(Zs)+U
′(Zs)(ui(t,Zs)+u j(Zs)) .
We also note that U˜ ′(Zs)dξ
c
js = 0 for all s from condition (i) since dξ
c
js = 0 if Zs ∈ D j and U˜
′(Zs) =
U ′(Zs) if Zs ∈C j. Also note that the process Zt spends zero time within D j, so U˜(Zs)−U˜(Zs−) =
U(Zs)−U(Zs−) for all s> 0. Then we can re-express (A.4) as the following equality:
U(x) =Ex[e−rτn∧tU(Zτn∧t)]−E
x
[ˆ τn∧t
0
e−rs(AU(Zs)+U
′(Zs)u j(Zs)+U
′(Zs)ui(s,Zs))ds
]
−Ex
[ˆ τn∧t
0
e−rsU ′(Zs)
2
∑
l=1
dξcls+ ∑
0≤s≤τn∧t
e−rs[U(Zs)−U(Zs−)]
]
. (A.5)
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We note that
AU(Zs)+U
′(Zs)(ui(t,Zs)+u j(Zs))≤ kiui(t,Zs)−pii(Zs)
because of condition (iii). Regarding player j’s singular control, we haveU(Zs−+∆ξ js)−U(Zs−) =
0 for any ∆ξ js > 0 because of condition (i) thatU
′(x) = 0 for all x within the interior of D j. Lastly,
we note that U ′(Zs)∑
2
l=1dξ
c
ls ≤ kidξ
c
is because U
′(x) ≤ ki from condition (iii) and U
′(Zs)dξ
c
js = 0
from condition (i), andU(Zs−+∆ξis)−U(Zs−)≤ ki∆ξis fromU
′(x)≤ ki. Combining all these facts,
we obtain
U(x)≥Ex[e−rτn∧tU(Zτn∧t)]+E
x[
ˆ τn∧t
0
e−rs(pii(Zs)− kiui(t,Zs))ds]
− kiE
x[
ˆ τn∧t
0
e−rsdξcis+ ∑
0≤s≤τn∧t
e−rs∆ξis] .
SinceU(·) is non-decreasing andU ′(x)≤ ki, we have (U(Zt))
− ≤ ki(Zt)
−+C0 for someC0 > 0.
Furthermore, in comparison to the uncontrolled process Xt , we have Zt ≥Xt for any control strategies
taken by the players because the controls ξi and ξ j always boost Zt . It follows that (Zt)
− ≤ (Xt)
−
for all t ≥ 0 if X0 = Z0. By virtue of Assumption 1 (ii), {e
−rτ(U(Zτ))
− : τ > 0 stopping time} is
uniformly integrable under any control strategy profile (ξi,ξ j). Thus, we have
liminf
n→∞
E
x[e−rτn∧tU(Zτn∧t)] = E
x[liminf
n→∞
e−rτn∧tU(Zτn∧t)] = E
x[e−rtU(Zt)] .
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From Fatou’s lemma, we have
U(x)≥ liminf
n→∞
E
x[e−rτn∧tU(Zτn∧t)]+ liminf
n→∞
E
x
[ˆ τn∧t
0
e−rs(pii(Zs)− kiui(t,Zs))ds
]
− ki liminf
n→∞
E
x[
ˆ τn∧t
0
e−rsdξcis+ ∑
0≤s≤τn∧t
e−rs∆ξis]
≥Ex[e−rtU(Zt)]+E
x[
ˆ t
0
e−rs(pii(Zs)− kiui(t,Zs))ds]
− kiE
x[
ˆ t
0
e−rsdξcis+ ∑
0≤s≤t
e−rs∆ξis] .
We note that U(Zt) ≤ M for some M > 0 because it is bounded from above. Furthermore,
because U ′(·) is bounded from above by ki by condition (iii), we have (U(Zt))
− ≤ ki(Zt)
−+C0
for some constant C0 > 0. Recall that (Zt)
− ≤ (Xt)
− for the uncontrolled process Xt and that
limt→∞E
x[e−rt(Xt)
−] = 0 by Assumption 1. Therefore, limt→∞E
x[e−rtU(Zt)] = 0 is also satisfied,
and so we obtain
U(x)≥ Ex[
ˆ ∞
0
e−rs(pii(Zs)− kiui(t,Zs))ds]− ki
ˆ ∞
0
e−rsdξcis− ki ∑
0≤s<∞
e−rs∆ξis]
=Vi(x;ξi,ξ j) .
Since ξi is an arbitrary strategy of player i that satisfies dξit = ui(t,Zt)+dξ
c
it +∆ξit , we have proved
thatU(x) dominates all payoff functions that belong to the set {Vi(x;ξi,ξ j) : ξi ∈ Σi}.
Lastly, we consider Z subject to the strategy profile (ξ∗i ,ξ j). Note that {e
−rτU(Zτ) : τ> 0 stopping time}
is uniformly integrable becauseU(·) is bounded from above and {e−rτ(U(Zτ))
− : τ> 0 stopping time}
is uniformly integrable. By condition (iv), it is straightforward to verify that all the weak inequal-
ities above can be exactly replaced by equalities if ξi above is replaced by ξ
∗
i . Therefore, ξ
∗
i is the
best response among Σi against ξ j, and U(·) is the best payoff function of player i within the set
{Vi(x;ξi,ξ j) : ξi ∈ Σi}.
Proof of Theorem 2: As a first step, we verify that V (x) in (4) and ξ given by the proposition
satisfy the conditions (i)–(iv) of Theorem 1.
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(i) Note that Ci =C j = I, and V (·) ∈C
2(I) and that V (·) is non-decreasing. Thus, condition (i)
is satisfied. Condition (ii) is not applicable because D1 = D2 = /0.
(iii) and (iv) For x > θ, we have V ′(x) ≤ k by the definition of V (·), and AV (x)+pi(x) = 0, so
condition (iii) is satisfied. For x≤ θ, we have V ′(x) = k and
AV (x)+pi(x)+u(x)V ′(x)+ v(U ′(x)− k) = 0
for any arbitrary v by the definition of u(·). Thus, condition (iii) is also satisfied for x≤ θ. Because
D1 = D2 = /0, it also follows that condition (iv) is satisfied.
Thus, we have proved that ξ = (ξi,ξ j) is a strategy profile that belongs to Σ = Σi×Σ j and that
Vi(x;ξ) = supζi∈ΣiVi(x;ζi,ξ j) = V (x) for both i = 1,2. This does not necessarily mean that ξ is a
Nash equilibrium. More precisely, we need to prove that ξi is the best response among Ξi. To prove
it, we only need to show that V (x) = supζi∈ΞiVi(x;ζi,ξ j), i.e., that V (·) is player i’s optimal value
function given ξ j. We do so by showing that there exists a singular control strategy ξ
∗
i ∈ Ξi such that
V (x) =Vi(x;ξ
∗
i ,ξ j) and that V (·) satisfies the optimality conditions for player i given in Section 2.2.
Given ξ j, the SDE of Z and its r-excessive characteristic operator are given by
dZt = [µ(Zt)+u j(Zt)]dt+σ(Zt)dWt ,
Aξ j =
1
2
σ(x)2∂2x +[µ(x)+u j(x)]∂x− r .
Consider ξ∗i with a singular control regionDi = (a,θ], which is consistent with the fact thatV
′(x) = k
for all x ∈ Di. First, note that Aξ jV (x)+pi(x) = 0 and V
′(x)≤ k for all x ∈ I. Second, it follows that
[Aξ jV (x)+pi(x)][V
′(x)− k] = 0 for all x ∈ I. Thus, all the conditions of the optimality are satisfied,
and we conclude that V (x) = supζi∈ΞiVi(x;ζi,ξ j).
Proof of Theorem 3: Assume that there exists a regular control MPE with a payoff function
Vi(·;ξ) ∈ C
2(I). To prove Theorem 3, we establish the following two statements: (i) The control
regions of both players must coincide. (ii) Player i’s control region must be (a,θi). Given (i) and
(ii), because of the assumption θi 6= θ j, we arrive at a contradiction and hence prove the theorem.
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Below we employ Theorem 11.2.1 of Øksendal (2003) to prove (i) and (ii). For the theorem
to be applicable, a few conditions have to be satisfied. First, Vi(·;ξ) ∈ C
2(I) has to be satisfied,
which is assume above. Second, we need to have |AVi(x;ξ)|< ∞ ∀x ∈ I, which is satisfied because
of Assumption 1. Lastly, we need to have |[ui(x)+ u j(x)]V
′
i (x;ξ)| < ∞ ∀x ∈ I, which is satisfied
because we limit ξ to Σi×Σ j. Thus, Theorem 11.2.1 of Øksendal (2003) is applicable.
(i) We first prove that the regular control regions Ei = {x ∈ I : ui(x) > 0} of both players must
coincide, i.e., E1 =E2. Suppose that there exists a non-empty open set Fi⊂Ei\E j such that ui(x)> 0
but u j(x) = 0 whenever x ∈ Fi. Note that V
′
i (x;ξ)≤ ki; if there exists an interval in which V
′
i (x;ξ)>
ki, then it behooves player i to adopt a singular control strategy in this interval, which contradicts
the assumption that the equilibrium is characterized only by regular control strategies. By Theorem
11.2.1 of Øksendal (2003), Vi(x;ξ) must satisfy the following HJB equation in Fi:
AVi(x;ξ)+pii(x)+ui(x)[V
′
i (x;ξ)− ki] = 0
such that ui(x)> 0 only ifV
′
i (x;ξ) = ki. Here we used the fact that u j(x) = 0 in Fi. By the assumption
that ui(x)> 0 for all x ∈ Fi, Vi(x;ξ) = v0+ kix for some constant v0. Then the solution to
AVi(x;ξ)+pii(x) = µ(x)ki− r[v0+ kix]+pii(x) = 0
cannot be a non-empty open interval according to Assumption 4. Thus, the necessary HJB condition
cannot be satisfied in Fi. It follows that a non-empty open set Fi ⊂ Ei\E j cannot exist for either
i. Because ui(·) is Lipschitz continuous, it implies Ei = E j. For convenience, we let E = Ei = E j
denote the common regular control region for the remainder of this proof.
(ii) By Theorem 11.2.1 of Øksendal (2003), Vi(·;ξ) must satisfy
AVi(z;ξ)+pii(z)+u j(z)∂zVi(z;ξ)+ui(z)[∂zVi(z;ξ)− ki] = 0 , (A.6)
where ui(x) > 0, V
′
i (x;ξ) = ki and u j(x) > 0 must be satisfied only if x ∈ E, and ui(x) = u j(x) = 0
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and V ′i (x;ξ) < ki must be satisfied for x 6∈ E. Furthermore, since u j(x) > 0 for x ∈ E, in order for
(A.6) to hold, AVi(x;ξ)+pii(x) < 0 needs to be satisfied for x ∈ E. In summary, the most salient
necessary conditions are [AVi(x;ξ)+pii(x)][V
′
i (x;ξ)−ki] = 0, AVi(x;ξ)+pii(x)≤ 0, andV
′
i (x;ξ)≤ ki.
These conditions exactly coincide with the optimality conditions for a single decision maker singular
stochastic control problem given in Section 2.2. By virtue of Lemma 1, there is a unique function
V ∗i (·) given by (4) where θ and pi are replaced by θ1 and pi1 that satisfies these necessary conditions.
Based on the form of V ∗i (·) given by (4), the regular control region is Ei = (a,θi).
From (ii), we conclude that the equilibrium is characterized by the player’s control region Ei =
(a,θi) and E j = (a,θ j). However, as established by (i), the two control regions must coincide
(Ei = E j), which is not possible if θi 6= θ j. Therefore, there is no regular control strategy equilibrium
with associated payoff functions Vi(·;ξ) ∈C
2(I).
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that ξ1 continuously evolves inC1 = (a,θ
′)∪ (θ,b) and ξ2 contin-
uously evolves in C2 = I according to the strategy profile ξ. To prove the proposition, it is sufficient
to verify thatU1(·) andU2(·) with the strategy profile ξ satisfy all the conditions of Theorem 1. The
complete proof exactly parallels that of Theorem 2.
We first assume ξ2 and examine U1(·). First, it is straightforward to verify that U1(·) satisfies
conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 because C2 = I. Hence, we only need to verify (iii) and (iv).
Because of the forms of u1(·) and u2(·) given in (8) and (9), we have AU1(x)+pi1(x)+u2(x)U
′
1(x) =
0 for all x< θ′. We also haveU ′1(x)≤ k1 for all and x∈ I, and, in particular,U
′
1(x) = k1 for all x< θ1.
Hence, conditions (iii) and (iv) are satisfied.
Next, we verify thatU2(·) given ξ1 satisfies the conditions (i)-(iv) of Theorem 1.
(i) Note that D1 = [θ
′,θ1] and that U2(·) is constant in D1. Furthermore, by the definition of B
in (10), we have limx↓θ1U
′
2(x) = 0. Note that, by the nature of a singular control, ξ
l
1t evolves only at
the right-most boundary of the singular control region D1. This implies that U
′
2(Zt) = 0 whenever
dξl1t > 0 so thatU
′
2(Zt)dξ
l
1t = 0. Hence, (i) is satisfied.
(ii) The first derivative ofU2(·) is discontinuous (not defined) at x= θ
′, and its second derivative
is in general not defined at x = θ1. However, given the first and second derivatives of U2(·) near
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θ′ and θ1, it is always possible to construct a function U˜2(·) ∈C
2(I) such that U˜2(x) =U(x) for all
x ∈C1 = (a,θ
′)∪ (θ1,b) as long as θ
′ < θ1.
(iii) For x> θ1, we have AU2(x)+pi2(x) = 0 by the form ofU2(·), andU
′
2(x)≤ k2 is satisfied so
that v2[U
′
2(x)− k2] ≤ 0 for any v2 ≥ 0. Hence, condition (iii) is satisfied for (θ1,b). For all x < θ
′,
we have AU2(x)+pi2(x)+u1(x)k2 = 0 by the form of u1(·), andU
′
2(x) = k2. Thus, condition (iii) is
satisfied for all x ∈C1. Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify (iv) from the forms of ui(·).
B R&D Game with Spillover
An example of variable contribution games is an R&D game with spillover, which often occurs in
high-tech industries. The technological advances made by one firm most often spill over to another
firm through various means such as reverse engineering, leakage of information due to geographic
proximity, etc.
We consider two firms engaging in R&D to develop a new technology. For simplicity, we assume
that the outcome of one firm’s successful completion of R&D completely spills over to the other.1
We also assume that the two firms are not in direct competition with each other because they are
in two separate markets although they use the same technology. This model is an extension of an
attrition game: each firm would rather that its opponent conducts the R&D. Thus, the R&D effort is
subject to a free rider problem. Unlike the canonical attrition game, the two firms’ levels of R&D
effort are the state variables.
Let R denote the reward to each firm from the new technology, irrespective of which firm de-
velops it, and let λit ≥ 0 denote the effort level of firm i ∈ {1,2} at time t. The completion time of
firm i’s R&D is an exponential random variable with the instantaneous arrival rate of λit . Hence, by
the property of a Poisson process, the instantaneous arrival rate of the first completion of R&D is
given by λ1t +λ2t . We model the cost of maintaining the effort level of λit as cλ
2
it/2 per unit time.
Furthermore, in order to increase the effort level by ∆λit > 0, firm i has to spend k∆λit for some
1The assumption of complete spillover is not an essential one; partial spillover can be easily modeled, but it would
complicate the analysis without altering the main insight.
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k > 0. Each firm i can increase λit by any amount at any time but can never decrease it.
Let (λit)t≥0 denote the non-decreasing process of the effort level of firm i, and let Tˆi denote
the random completion time of firm i’s R&D given the process (λit)t≥0. Given the strategy profile
Λ = ((λit)t≥0,(λ jt)t≥0), firm i’s payoff at t = 0 is given by
Vi(Λ) = E
[ˆ Tˆ1∧Tˆ2
0
e−rt(−
c
2
λ2it)dt+ e
−rTˆ1∧Tˆ2R−
ˆ Tˆ1∧Tˆ2
0
e−rtkdλit
]
. (B.1)
The goal of this section is to demonstrate the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium char-
acterized by singular control strategies. Hence, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which the
firms immediately boost λit to the equilibrium level. In particular, we show that there exists a sym-
metric subgame perfect equilibrium in which both firms immediately set their effort level at a unique
value λ∗ given by
λ∗ =
r
8k+3c
[
−(4k+ c)r+
√
(4k+ c)2+2(R/r− k)(8k+3c)
]
, (B.2)
and maintain it until the end of the game. We can verify that this is an equilibrium by the first-order
optimality condition for each player’s best response. Here we assume that the reward is sufficiently
large so that
(4k+ c)2+2(R/r− k)(8k+3c)> 0 .
Proposition B.1 Suppose that the initial effort levels are given by λi0 < λ
∗ and λ j0< λ
∗. Then there
exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which both firms boost their effort levels up to λ∗ at time
zero.
Proof: Suppose that firm 2’s strategy is to boost the effort level to a level λ2 at time zero and
keep it at this level until the end of the game. Our goal is to obtain the best response of firm 1. Let
λ1,0 denote the initial effort level of firm 1. Given firm 2’s strategy, firm 1’s best response should be
to similarly boost the effort level to some value λ and keep it until the end of the game because of
the Markov property of the Poisson process.
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As a first step, we compute the following:
E[exp(−rTˆ1∧ Tˆ2)] =
ˆ ∞
0
λ2e
−λ2t2dt2
ˆ t2
0
λe−λt1dt1e
−rt1
+
ˆ ∞
0
λe−λt1dt1
ˆ t1
0
λ2e
−λ2t2dt2e
−rt2
=
λ+λ2
r+λ+λ2
.
From () we obtain
V1(Λ) =−
c
2r
λ2+(R+
c
2r
λ2)
λ+λ2
r+λ+λ2
− k(λ−λ1,0) .
It follows that the first derivative is
∂V1(Λ)
∂λ
=
c
2λ
2+Rr− cλ(r+λ+λ2)
(r+λ+λ2)2
− k
=
Rr− cλ(r+λ/2+λ2)− k(r+λ+λ2)
2
(r+λ+λ2)2
.
Note that the numerator of the second line is a concave function of λ, so the maximum value ofV1(Λ)
is achieved by a unique value of λ that satisfies the first-order condition ∂V1(Λ)/∂λ = 0. Assuming
a symmetric equilibrium with λ = λ2 that solves the first order equation ∂Vi(Λ)/∂λ = 0, we obtain
λ = λ∗ given by (B.2). Therefore, immediately boosting the effort level to λ∗ is the best response to
firm 2’s strategy of λ2 = λ
∗. Since the firms are symmetric, the same is true for firm 2. We conclude
that the given strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Even though the game is an extension of an attrition game, the equilibrium obtained above is
characterized by an immediate lump sum (singular) control rather than a mutual delay of action
or gradualism. Intuitively, the emergence of a singular control equilibrium is due to the players’
ability to control its states (level of effort). In contrast to canonical attrition games that allow for
only binary actions, the players of a variable concession game can control their degree of concession
immediately by a modest amount, so they do not need to delay their concession.
43
